Monthly Archives: January 2011

Dealings with a Fish

In “Normal Circumstances, Literal Meanings, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases” Stanley Fish attacks the view, represented by quotations from John Searle, that sentences have definite meanings. Searle sets … Continue reading

Posted in Rhetor 20: Interpretations | Leave a comment

Identity theorists must be epiphenomenalists

Epiphenomenalism is the belief that mental states cannot cause any physical events. It is necessarily a determinist view. The identity theory is the theory that mental states are identical with brain states. An identity theorist believes that all brain states … Continue reading

Posted in Phil 132: Mind | Leave a comment

Functionalism falls short

In Mind: A Brief Introduction, Searle describes functionalism as an attempt to capture definitions of beliefs, desires, and perceptions by their causal relations. For example, we have a sentence: Jones’s belief that it is raining was caused by the perception … Continue reading

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On Dogmatics in Philosophy

In chapter 2 of Mind: A Brief Introduction Searle dismisses the views of modern dualists because they seem to be ad hoc maneuvers. “The authors are convinced in advance of the truth of dualism and are trying to find some … Continue reading

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First thoughts on Being and Time

In Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reader’s Guide, William Blattner writes that Heidegger uses Husserl’s Phenomenological method in his analysis of everyday life. That method being a “way of disentangling the mind’s representation from the objects it represents and from … Continue reading

Posted in Phil 185: Heidegger | 1 Comment