Monthly Archives: February 2011

Kripke’s Refutation of Identity Theory

Identity theorists claim that mental states are identical with brain states. Identity theorists usually espouse one of two versions of this claim. Either 1) tokens of types of mental states are identical with tokens of types of brain states, or … Continue reading

Posted in Papers, Phil 132: Mind | 2 Comments

Heidegger pulls a Kant

Martin Heidegger begins Being & Time by saying “Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely.” He means to answer the very difficult question “What is … Continue reading

Posted in Phil 185: Heidegger | Leave a comment

When Kripke first used a rigid designator

Edit: This post has been turned into a paper discussing Kripke’s argument against identity theory. So the story goes, identity theorists claim that mental states are identical with brain states. Identity theorists usually espouse one of two versions of this … Continue reading

Posted in Phil 132: Mind | Leave a comment